Key Takeaways:
- A US House Judiciary Committee report alleges the European Commission and Romanian authorities used the Digital Services Act (DSA) to suppress political speech.
- The report claims this was part of a coordinated effort to influence the outcome of Romania's 2024 presidential election, which was later annulled.
- The investigation found no evidence to support official claims of Russian interference, which were used to justify censorship demands.
- The case is presented as the most extreme example of a wider EU trend of pressuring platforms to censor content, particularly targeting conservative and populist viewpoints.
A Controversial Election and a Startling Report
Romania's 2024 presidential election was a political earthquake. An anti-establishment candidate, Calin Georgescu, won the first round and was poised for a landslide victory in the second. Then, the constitutional court annulled the vote. Official claims of Russian interference via social media campaigns filled the air, but no public evidence was provided.
What appeared to be a national crisis is now framed in a new, alarming light. A 160-page investigation by the US House Judiciary Committee, published in February, alleges the affair was a test case for EU institutions intervening in member states' politics. The report claims Brussels orchestrated a "decade-long campaign" to censor political speech across the bloc, with Romania as its "gravest example."
The Russian Narrative and the Missing Evidence
The official narrative from Bucharest and Brussels was clear: Georgescu's popularity was not organic but the product of a Russian-orchestrated disinformation campaign, primarily on TikTok. This justification was used to challenge the election's legitimacy.
The US committee's report, however, paints a starkly different picture. It cites internal TikTok documents and emails showing the platform repeatedly told EU and Romanian authorities it found no evidence of a coordinated Russian influence operation boosting Georgescu. This critical assessment was allegedly never shared publicly by the authorities pushing the narrative.
The report states TikTok "consistently assessed Moscow 'did not conduct a coordinated influence operation to boost Georgescu’s campaign.'"
The Digital Services Act in Action: A Tool for Censorship?
The investigation details how Romanian officials allegedly abused the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) framework. Key findings include:
- Expansive Power: Authorities used "expansive interpretations of their own power" to mandate removals of political content, often without legal justification.
- Global Takedown Orders: Bucharest reportedly argued that court orders to block content for Romanians were "mandatory not only in Romania," a move seen as targeting the diaspora vote.
- Vague Justifications: TikTok was ordered to remove content deemed "disrespectful" to the ruling PSD party. When the platform asked for legal grounds, none were provided.
After Georgescu's first-round victory, demands reportedly escalated. Regulators allegedly told TikTok that "all materials containing Calin Georgescu images must be removed," again without a legal basis—a step the platform refused to take.
The Role of EU-Funded NGOs
The pressure campaign wasn't limited to state authorities. The report highlights the role of EU-funded NGOs empowered as DSA Trusted Flaggers. These supposedly neutral organizations allegedly made "politically biased content removal demands."
A key example is the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media. Funded by the EU, it reportedly sent TikTok spreadsheets with hundreds of censorship requests after the first round, targeting what the committee called "pro-Georgescu and anti-progressive political speech." This included posts on:
- Environmental issues
- Romania's membership in the Schengen Area
- The EU's system of open borders
Since the report's release, references to the observatory's EU financing have reportedly been deleted from its website.
After the Annulment: Escalating Pressure on Platforms
Even after the election was annulled, pressure on TikTok allegedly intensified. The European Commission is said to have:
- Opened a formal DSA investigation into TikTok for failing to sufficiently censor content related to the election.
- Summoned TikTok's product team (not its compliance staff) for a meeting, seeking "deeper influence over the platform’s internal moderation processes."
- Continued using the unproven Russian meddling narrative to push for more aggressive censorship.
In response, TikTok reportedly agreed to censor content featuring the terms "coup" and "war" for 60 days to "mitigate the risk of harmful narratives."
The Fate of the Candidate
For Calin Georgescu, the political consequences were severe. After being banned from the re-run election, he was arrested and charged with "incitement to actions against the constitutional order." Later accusations of plotting a coup and fraud were reportedly dropped by February 2026. He now faces trial for "far-right propaganda."
The establishment-preferred candidate, Nicusor Dan, won the presidency. Romania's Constitutional Court validated the result.
A Pattern Beyond Romania
The committee asserts Romania is not an isolated case. It claims the European Commission has pressured platforms to censor content ahead of elections in:
- Slovakia
- The Netherlands
- France
- Moldova
- Ireland
- The EU-wide elections in June 2024
"In all of these cases… documents demonstrate a clear bias toward censoring conservative and populist parties," the report concludes.
Ahead of the 2024 EU elections, TikTok was allegedly pressured into censoring over 45,000 pieces of content deemed "misinformation," including political speech on migration, climate, and security.
The report warns these efforts are likely to continue and even escalate, pointing to the upcoming Hungarian elections as a potential next flashpoint. It concludes that the EU's censorship apparatus, as demonstrated in Romania, stands ready to influence democratic outcomes, "regardless of truth, and popular will."